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ABSTRACT
In recent years, air trac communication data has become easy
to access, enabling novel research in many elds. Exploiting this
new data source, a wide range of applications have emerged, from
weather forecasting to stock market prediction, or the collection of
information about military and government movements. Typically
these applications require knowledge about the metadata of the
aircra, specically its operator and the aircra category.
armasuisse Science + Technology, the R&D agency for the Swiss
Armed Forces, has been developing Classi-Fly, a novel approach to
obtain metadata about aircra based on their movement paerns.
We validate Classi-Fly using several hundred thousand ights col-
lected through open source means, in conjunction with ground
truth from publicly available aircra registries containing more
than two million aircra. Classi-Fly obtains the correct aircra
category with an accuracy of over 88%, demonstrating that it can
improve the meta data necessary for applications working with
air trac communication. Finally, we show that it is feasible to
automatically detect specic ights such as police and surveillance
missions.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Information systems→ Clustering and classication; Busi-
ness intelligence; •Applied computing→ Aerospace;
KEYWORDS
aviation, aircra classication, open datasets, air trac control, air
trac management, open source intelligence
1 INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourced aircra trajectory data has gained signicant impor-
tance in recent years enhancing data collection for several scientic
elds and opening up new research opportunities. With the large-
scale and open availability of globally distributed ground sensors,
hundreds of research publications across dierent subjects have
been exploiting this novel data source.1 Most, if not all, of these
investigations require knowledge about the broad category of an
aircra, e.g., whether it is a commercial airliner, a ghter jet, or a
small private airplane; and its use case (e.g., government, business,
surveillance, or military).
1A regularly maintained list of examples can be found at hps://opensky-network.
org/community/publications.
is development has been enabled by the rise of soware-
dened radios (SDRs), which have become readily available and
aordable over the past decade and greatly reduced the barriers
to entry, meaning that users can now take part in crowdsourced
sensor networks with lile cost. As such, it is now straightforward
to collect all air trac surveillance communication directly from
aircra, providing information about ight trajectories, including
its position, velocity and unique identiers in order to tell them
apart and track them over time. Based on this principle, many com-
mercial ventures have been created, for example Flightradar24 and
FlightAware, who in turn provide sophisticated data-based services
to aviation stakeholders.
In the wake of COVID-19, the interest in trajectory-based re-
search has accelerated even further. Relevant research can be sepa-
rated into two dierent areas of modeling, pandemic and economic.
e rst area, epidemiological modeling of the possible spread
of COVID-19, was of crucial interest early in the stages of the
pandemic. e utility of ight data for this purpose was illustrated
for example in widely circulated studies such as [6] but has been
known to be useful in the context of pandemics formuch longer (e.g.,
[22]). Knowing aircra category and operator can help improve
the accuracy of these models, i.e. in estimating the number of
passengers on each tracked aircra.
e second main area, economic modeling, uses ights either
as an indicator of economic activity (at a given airport, region, or
globally) as illustrated in [23] or as a direct measure of the impact
on the aviation sector (in particular cargo and passenger transport).
Here, the speed of these indicators is the crucial advantage, as they
allow to ‘nowcast’ the economy faster than traditional methods.
Examples of such use of data provided by OpenSky can be found
in the Bank of England’s quarterly Monetary Policy Report [4] or
the National Statistics Oce of Denmark [37]. Again, obtaining
accurate metadata about the operators and purpose of the tracked
aircra is crucial for improving the accuracy of these models.
Crucially, contrary to the trajectories, there is no helpful infor-
mation about the aircra types, categories or operators broadcast
by the aircra themselves. To solve this issue, researchers rely
broadly on external databases, maintained through a mix of crowd-
sourcing by aviation enthusiasts and ocial databases provided by
a few countries’ aviation agencies such as the US Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) [11]. Unfortunately, these sources are of only
limited use as they are incomplete and outdated for many of the
world’s aircra, which poses a major challenge to applications in
this area.
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Figure 1: Representation of ADS-B and SSR systems.
In this paper, we present a machine-learning approach to solve
this problem called Classi-Fly. We rst deal with the challenges of
incomplete and unreliable ground truth by verifying the categories
of our dataset manually. Using this dataset, we show that it is
feasible to automatically classify aircra into dierent operator
categories based purely on their learned ight movement paerns.
Contrary to other classication approaches, Classi-Fly works on
features directly derived from the trajectories, which cannot be
altered by the aircra operator, a crucial advantage over classical
methods.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• On a dataset of 182,325 ights, we show that it is feasible
to automatically learn the category of a given aircra with
over 88% accuracy based solely on its ight behaviour. We
build amodel based on features derived from this behaviour
and compare the accuracy of four dierent classiers.
• Using this approach, we classify previously unknown air-
cra into dierent categories, eectively deriving metadata
information for these aircra, which can be used for popu-
lar research applications from open-source intelligence to
epidemiological modeling.
• We discuss the implications of our method, including po-
tential countermeasures, and analyze a case study of previ-
ously unidentied aircra with sensitive mission proles.
e remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
2 describes the necessary background on air trac control and
tracking. Section 3 describes the fundamentals of our approach. 4
introduces our data collection process. Section 5 describes our ex-
perimental design before Sections 6 and 7 present the performance
of the analyzed classiers on the ground truth and new data, re-
spectively. Finally, Section 8 and 9 cover the discussion and related
work before Section 10 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
is section provides the necessary background to how aircra
tracking works. Fig. 1 shows the wireless communication links of
two considered technologies, which are explained in the following.
2.1 Surveillance Technologies in Aviation
ere are two main surveillance technologies used for cooperative
tracking of civil aircra. Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) uses
the so-called transponder Modes A, C, and S, which provide digital
target information (altitude, squawk identication) compared to tra-
ditional primary radar (PSR). Aircra transponders are interrogated
on the 1030 MHz frequency and reply with the desired information
on the 1090 MHz channel (see Fig. 1, right.) With the newer Au-
tomatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) protocol (see
Fig. 1, le), aircra regularly broadcast their own identity, position,
velocity and other information such as intent or emergency codes.
ese broadcasts do not require interrogation; position and velocity
are automatically transmied at 2Hz [27].
2.2 Aircra Identiers in Air Trac
Communication
A 24-bit address assigned by the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization (ICAO) to every aircra is transmied via both ADS-B and
SSR. Crucially, this identier is dierent to an aircra squawk or
call sign. Squawks, of which only 4096 exist, are allocated locally
and not eective for continuous tracking. e call sign can be set
separately through the ight deck for every ight. Call signs of
private aircra typically consist of the aircra registration num-
ber, commercial airliners use the ight number, and military and
government operators oen use special call signs depending on
their mission. In contrast, the ICAO identier is globally unique
and provides an address space of 16 million; while the transponder
can be re-programmed by engineers, the identier is not easily (or
legally) changed by a pilot. ese characteristics make it ideal for
continuous tracking over a prolonged period of time.
2.3 Required Data Mining Capabilities
Aircra tracking is the act of obtaining live or delayed positional
information on aircra by passive actors. eir motivations range
from traditional hobbyist planespoing enthusiasm over military
and business interests to environmental science. Where tradition-
ally most spoers have conducted their trade purely using visual
means, i.e., seeing and recognizing the aircra near an airport, mod-
ern soware-dened radio (SDR) technology has made accurate,
fast and scalable tracking of aircra feasible for anyone.
ere are two options to exploit SDRs: install their own personal
receivers or use the SDR data aggregated by web tracking services.
While a single receiver with a radius of up to 600 km can already
provide interesting results, the insights are increased considerably
with a larger network. Both live tracking data and the required
metadata are easily accessible on-line as discussed in Section 4.
3 CLASSI-FLY
Classi-Fly is a machine-learning approach to categorize an aircra
purely on its behaviour, i.e. the way it moves over time rather than
relying on self-reported information such as call signs and / or
fallible databases.
More concretely, Classi-Fly analyses collected trajectories of air-
cra and breaks them down into 12 principal features, based on
ight duration, position, velocity and acceleration. Using these
features, it learns the behaviour of 8 dierent aircra categories,
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Table 1: Description of the ground truth dataset, compris-
ing 9880 randomly selected aircra with a maximum of 25
ights.
Flights / Aircra States / Flight Duration / Flight [s]
Mean 20.3148 152.62 4669
Median 25 79 1897
Total 200,710 30,633,219 937,223,660
from commercial to military and government aircra. is in turn
enables the user to automatically classify aircra improve a knowl-
edge base that is oen incomplete and erroneous.
3.1 Applications
During the COVID-19 pandemic, aircra trajectory-based research
has accelerated signicantly. Scientic modeling has used aircra
trajectory data tomeasure the impact of the implementedmitigation
measures on the economy [12, 16], nature [18] and air trac itself
[36]. e growing interest is reected in the popularity of new
datasets, which have seen signicant uptake in a short time [25].
Beyond this, journalists and scientic researchers alike have
previously examined aircra trajectories to beer understand the
security and privacy of the global air trac system. For example, re-
porters have used such data to uncover federal surveillance aircra
[2]. More scientic use cases in the literature include the analysis
of mergers and acquisitions data of public companies [33], or the
in-depth analysis of privacy leaks [31].
To support these use cases, Classi-Fly can also contribute directly
towards open data initiatives such as the OpenSky Network aircra
metadata database, which in turn is used for a wide variety of
research applications (e.g., [28, 31, 33]).
3.2 Traditional Acquisition of Aircra
Categories
e standard way to do obtain the required aircra category uses
the owner (or operator) and the aircra model (e.g., corporate jets
such as a Gulfstream), from which the use case and category of
the aircra may be inferred with good certainty. For instance, the
Swiss Air Force operates aircra for military operations, whereas
business jets are likely used for corporate purposes.
However, in a large percentage of cases there is no meta infor-
mation available for observed aircra. is makes it much more
dicult to identify the category of an aircra. A recent study found
that around 15% of all transponder-equipped aircra could not be
found using publicly available data [28]. Typically, these aircra
are from countries that do not provide an open aircra registry.
Furthermore, they may be outdated entries or registered recently.
3.3 Advantage of Behavioural Features
In order to supplement and verify unreliable and incomplete meta-
data collected through external sources, Classi-Fly uses exclusively
behavioural features based on an aircra’s trajectories. e main
advantage of this approach is that these features cannot be trivially
altered or spoofed by the aircra operator. is is contrary to any
classication based on the content of their communication.
Non-behavioural features, which are based on content broadcast
by an aircra, are primarily its transponder code, the call sign and
the squawk code, i.e., the aircra identiers described in Section
2.2. e laer two are set by the pilot (oen in accordance with
local customs and air trac controllers) and can thus be adapted
practically at will. e transponder code is also not reliable in many
situations, e.g. when the US American Air Force One presented as
a dierent, non-existent aircra [14].
ere is additional information about the capabilities of an air-
cra provided by the Mode S Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) protocol
features used by some aircra. While interesting in theory, we have
decided to not use these for our classication task for the following
reasons: First, they, too, can easily be changed and manipulated by
the aircra operator at will. More crucially however, these commu-
nication options are not consistently used, over 50% of aircra do
not broadcast any information besides position and velocity.
Requirements for Classi-Fly include robustness against malicious
actors and intentional manipulation of the communication data by
the aircra operator. Consequently, all features that could be ma-
nipulated were excluded in our design. is leaves only behavioural
features, which cannot be altered by an aircra at all (e.g. increasing
maximum possible velocity) or at least not without signicant cost
in terms of time and resources (e.g., diversions, distraction ights
or other large changes to the mission paern that make an aircra
look like a dierent class). Please note that while the content of
ADS-B messages is fundamentally not secured, the behavioural
features based on location and speed can be veried reliably using
physical-layer methods such as multilateration [34].
4 DATA COLLECTION
We now describe the processes for the collection of ne-grained
tracking data and for obtaining aircra ground truth from public
sources. All data used in this work has been openly available and
is thus already accessible to researchers on an ever growing scale.
4.1 e OpenSky Network
OpenSky is a crowdsourced network [27], which is used as the
backbone of our data collection. As of January 2020, the OpenSky
Network consists of more than 2500 registered sensors streaming
data to its servers. e network has currently received and stored
over 16 trillion ATC messages, adding over 20 billion messages
by more than 50,000 dierent aircra every day. As a non-prot,
research-oriented network, OpenSky oers open access to its data
to academic researchers and has been used for a large number
of publications spanning many dierent domains from aviation
security to climate change research. Detailed information about
the history, infrastructure and use cases of OpenSky are found in
[27].
Data Acquisition and Pre-Processing. Aircra trajectories can be
retrieved from the OpenSky Network for free for universities, ight
authorities, and other non-prot research institutions.2 e avail-
able data goes back several years, for which it oers dense coverage
2hps://opensky-network.org/data/impala
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of Europe and the USA. More recently, it has spread to other conti-
nents, although coverage in Africa in particular is still lacking as
it is based on volunteers to provide the locally broadcast aircra
communication. We obtained about 200,000 such aircra trajec-
tories for our ground truth and another 180,000 for the dierent
classication categories.
e raw data is obtained from OpenSky via an Impala shell and
consists of so-called state vectors, which describe the state of every
observed aircra, i.e., its position, altitude, and velocity in incre-
ments of one second. All state vectors were then separated into
ights, by dividing the positional data messages received by all
aircra as follows: Each positional state which is more than 10
minutes older than the next and is at an altitude of less than 2500m
is considered an arrival state, and hence a nished ight. Note that
not all ights seen by OpenSky are necessarily complete, if a ight
begins or nishes outside the coverage area, the rst/last message
will constitute the end point of the ight. We did not dierentiate
between complete or incomplete ights in order to maximize the
robustness of our approach. OpenSky conducts some additional pro-
cessing to lter out erroneous messages and transmission-induced
noise as well as potentially maliciously altered data [29].
4.2 Aircra Behavioural Ground Truth
To facilitate the feature selection in the next section, we required
ground truth on the average ight and movement behaviour of
aircra. We rst retrieved the positional data of 9880 randomly
selected aircra seen by OpenSky in the year 2017 to be able to
obtain the average values as boundaries for our features. is data
was capped at maximum of 25 ights per aircra, which resulted in
more than 200,000 collected ights, with an average duration of 4669
seconds and a total number of more than 30 million analyzed state
vectors. Table 1 provides the details of the ground truth dataset.
We then used these randomly selected aircra to learn the aver-
age aircra behaviour with regards to its ight features, which are
discussed in Section 5.2. For each feature, we quantized the data set
into q quantiles and learned these quantiles’ specic bounds. ese
are then used to model the relative behaviour of dierent aircra
categories for our classication task.
4.3 Aircra Metadata Ground Truth
ere are several public sources which provide meta-information
on aircra based on their identiers: the aircra registration or a
unique 24-bit address provided by ICAO. is typically includes
the aircra model (e.g., Airbus A320) and the owner/operator (e.g.,
British Airways), which we exploited to label our aircra category
ground truth.
We have used the following openly available sources to collect
and verify the ground truth for our work:
• e OpenSky Network has recently released an aircra
database complimenting its tracking eorts with crowd-
sourced metadata on over 495,000 aircra. Available here:
hps://opensky-network.org/aircra-database
• Another non-prot project, Airframes.org, is a valuable
source, oering comprehensive metadata about 609,000 air-
cra identiers. is includes background knowledge such
Table 2: Description of the evaluation data set.
A/C Category Aircra Ratio [%] Flights States [x1000]
Business 1000 16.6 36,119 5196
Commercial 1000 16.6 48,590 12,465
Fighter 921 15.3 6918 751
Small Utility 440 7.3 16,071 3360
Surveillance 403 6.7 15,384 4571
Tanker 402 6.7 7657 1125
Trainer 1080 18.0 23,778 5602
Transport 768 12.8 27,808 5067
Sum 6014 100 182,325 38,142
as pictures and historical ownership information (available
at hp://airframes.org).
• For aircra registered in the USA, the FAA provides a
daily updated database of all owner records, online and for
download. ese naturally exclude any sensitive owner
information but overall contain over 320,000 clean and
well-organised records as of January 2018 (available at
hps://registry.faa.gov/aircrainquiry/).
• Furthermore, the plane spoing community actively main-
tains many separate databases with spoed aircra. ey
usually operate SSR receivers and enrich the received data
with information such as operator, model, or registration
manually. e database structure of Kinetic Avionic’s
BaseStation soware has become the de facto standard for-
mat and is also used to exchange and share their databases
in forums and discussion boards. Our database version
used stems from November 2017, containing 455,457 rows
of aircra data.
• Lastly, web services such as FlightAware and FlightRadar24
provide online access to more than a million aircra IDs
(available at hp://www.ightaware.com and hp://www.
ightradar24.com).
When considering all these databases together, we had access to
metadata for 2,180,803 unique aircra identiers; this snapshot for
our work was taken in January 2018.
Note that these sources are naturally noisy, since they rely
on compiling many separate smaller databases, are oen (partly)
crowdsourced and change over time; aircra are frequently regis-
tered, de-registered and transferred globally. Due to the number
of aircra involved in the experiments in this paper we could not
verify the model and operator of every aircra by hand (i.e., by
following their behaviour on web trackers and ensure consistency
with the existing database). Nonetheless, this is a realistic situation
for anyone looking to accurately categorize aircra and requires
an approach which is robust to such noise uctuations.
4.4 Aircra Category Extraction
Based on the trajectory data provided by OpenSky and the collected
metadata, we obtained ight behaviour data for eight dierent
aircra categories described here in brief:
4
• Business jets: Business stakeholders typically y jets ca-
pable of 4-20 passengers. Gulfstream’s G-range, Cessna’s
Citation jets and Bombardier’s Learjet and Challenger air-
cra are amongst the most popular choices. However, this
category also comprises smaller and larger aircra as long
as they are operated for business use.
• Commercial airliners: A large group that makes up a
vast majority of passenger miles in the air. It is dened
by the operator, i.e. a commercial airline that conducts
scheduled transport, typically with large aircra seating
50 or more passengers (e.g., Airbus 320 or Boeing 737).
• Small utility aircra (‘general aviation’): is aircra
group comprises a large variety of aircra used privately
and in commercial operations, which we class as so-called
general aviation aircra. Typical examples are the Cessna
172 and 182, the most sold aircra models in the world.
• Military ghter aircra: Fighters are designed primarily
for air-to-air combat. Relatively few of these are equipped
with ADS-B transponders; our group consists mainly of
Euroghters, Tornados and F15/16 aircra.
• Military tanker aircra: ese aircra are capable of
refuelling other aircra in the air and provide essential
operational capabilities. By far the most representative
example in our dataset is the Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker.
• Military trainer aircra: is category includes smaller
jet and turboprop aircra used as training vehicle for mili-
tary pilots by air forces and navies around the world. Repre-
sentative examples of such trainer aircra are the Northrop
T-38 Talon or the Pilatus PC-21.
• Military transport aircra: ese are large aircra used
by the military to transport troops or equipment. Gen-
erally slower than aircra intended for air ghting, they
share some similarities with tanker aircra. In our dataset
these are represented mainly through the McDonnell Dou-
glas/Boeing C-17 Globemaster III.
• Civil surveillanceAircra:ese aircra are used by po-
lice agencies for surveillance purposes. ey are typically
small utility aircra with special equipment and exhibit
particular behaviour during their missions.
We note that these categories are not determined solely on air-
cra model but instead on their use cases as dened by the operator
(i.e., military or not). Indeed, there is also overlap in some military
aircra models, for example Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT)
aircra full several roles.
Knowledge of these categories can help with a number of use
cases. With the exception of the commercial airliners and small util-
ity aircra, all are directly potentially sensitive aircra categories.
Commercial airliners and business jets are required as input for
research on economic activity (for example [23]), while the laer
are also particularly interesting for investment banking studies
[33]. Civil surveillance aircra as a category have played a role in
uncovering clandestine operations by state and non-state-actors
[2], with small utility aircra being the category that most of such
surveillance aircra masquerade as. In the military context, telling
apart unidentied commercial aircra from potential threats can
make a dierence in highly volatile situations such as the accidental
Table 3: Top origin coun-
tries of the main dataset.
Country Aircra [%]
USA 2916 48.5
Germany 816 13.6
China 287 4.8
UK 239 4.0
Australia 212 3.5
Netherlands 160 2.7
Belgium 119 2.0
Canada 110 1.8
Table 4: Top origin coun-
tries of unknown aircra.
Country Aircra [%]
UK 121 11.4
Austria 96 9.0
Germany 71 6.6
China 67 6.3
Czech Rep. 59 5.5
Ireland 53 5.0
Australia 43 4.0
Brazil 40 3.8
shooting down of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 in Iran
in January 2020 [1]. Dierentiating between the categories of ght-
ers, tankers, trainers, and transport aircra serves as an additional
piece of information and can provide tactical advantages.
5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We describe the features used to determine aircra behaviour and
explain the evaluation data set used to predict aircra categories.
5.1 Evaluation Data Sets
To select our evaluation data set, we rst queried the full sample of
aircra seen by OpenSky in January 2018, which spanned 87,000
aircra in total. is sample was then classied into eight dierent
categories based on operator and model metadata (see Section 4.4).
We aimed to obtain 1000 aircra per category, however, for ve
of the subcategories (in particular those comprising military and
surveillance aircra) there are fewer aircra with reliable iden-
tication and the necessary transponder equipment required to
obtain the detailed ight behaviour data. us, we picked all avail-
able aircra for ghters, surveillance aircra, tankers, trainer and
transport aircra.
For small utility aircra, the available pool was larger, however,
due to the fact thatmany surveillance aircra share the same aircra
model (in particular Cessna 182’s [2]), manual inspection of all
aircra and their tracks was required to accurately label the ground
truth. For the abundant business and commercial categories, we
picked random 1000 aircra to represent their category.
us, the main data set used for our classication experiments
consists of 6014 aircra overall, each with a maximum of 50 ights.
Table 2 provides the breakdown of all aircra categories as well as
the number of ights and individual state vectors used to obtain
the classication features. e lowest number of ights (6918) and
messages (751,000) could be obtained for the 921 ghter aircra,
presumably due to their comparatively rare use. At the upper end,
the 1000 commercial aircra were seen on 48,590 ights with over
12 million messages, illustrating the high utilization of commercial
airliners. Overall, more than 185,000 ights and almost 40 million
messages were processed to obtain the behavioural features. Finally,
Table 3 shows the main countries of origin of our dataset, with the
US making up just under half of all aircra, followed by several
European countries, China, Australia and Canada.
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Table 5: Description of features, based on quantization of each behavioural feature into q parts.
ID Name Feature Description Avg. RMI
Flight Level
f1, ..., fq Duration Proportion of an aircra’s ight durations falling into q quantiles. 10.42%
fq+1, ..., f2q Bounding Box Proportion of a aircra’s ight areas as bounded by a box falling into q quantiles. 11.88%
State Vector Level
f2q+1, ..., f3q Altitude Proportion of altitude values recorded for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 11.84%
f3q+1, ..., f4q Heading Proportion of heading values recorded for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 8.66%
f4q+1, ..., f5q X-Velocity Proportion of X-velocity values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 16.63%
f5q+1, ..., f6q Y-Velocity Proportion of Y-velocity values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 13.67%
f6q+1, ..., f7q Vertical Rate Proportion of vertical rate values recorded for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 15.81%
f7q+1, ..., f8q Heading Speed Proportion of heading speed values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 13.57%
f8q+1, ..., f9q X-Acceleration Proportion of X-acceleration values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 14.53%
f9q+1, ..., f10q Y-Acceleration Proportion of Y-acceleration values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 14.67%
f10q+1, ..., f11q Vertical Acc. Proportion of vertical acceleration values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 15.93%
f11q+1, ..., f12q Heading Acc. Proportion of heading acceleration values derived for the aircra falling into q quantiles. 16.07%
Unknown Aircra. We further obtained all features described
in Section 5.2 from 1066 unknown aircra, i.e., aircra sending
messages with identiers where no metadata was available from
any of the structured sources. We use the communication received
from these identiers to gain insights on the category of their
aircra. Naturally, we consider that there will be some noise in
this dataset, which we will not be able to fully solve due to the
lack of ground truth. anks to OpenSky’s sanity checks, wrongly-
received identiers caused e.g. by transmission or decoding errors
have already been ltered out.
Based on the 24-bit identier, if truthful, it is possible to obtain
the country the aircra is nominally registered in, by comparing it
with the ocial ranges dened by the ICAO [17]. Table 4 shows the
main countries of origin, ranging from several European countries
to China, Brazil and Australia. We nd that the distribution is
dierent to the main dataset (albeit with a small sample size), in
particular the lack of US aircra is noteworthy.
We have several hypotheses and explanations for the absence of
these unknown aircra from available public sources:
(1) Sensitivity: Highly sensitive military or state aircra are
excluded from public records in most countries. Depending
on their missions, their country, and their use cases, hob-
byist plane spoers may not be able to ll these gaps with
information gleaned through traditional planespoing.
(2) Novel aircra: Depending on the quality of the public or
private records, aircra in many countries take several
weeks or months until they turn up in public databases.
(3) No records available: Many countries’ aviation authorities
do not maintain a consistent and well-kept database in the
rst place. In others, such as Germany, privacy regula-
tions are extremely strict, preventing aircra records from
nding their way into the public domain.
(4) Wrong transponder ID: Finally, there are occurrences, where
the transponder ID seing of an aircra does not match
the public records, creating discrepancies in the metadata.
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Figure 2: Feature correlation matrix. 0 indicates no correla-
tion, 1 and -1 positive and negative correlation, respectively.
We can observe strong clusters of (anti-)correlations around
both acceleration and velocity features.
5.2 Feature Extraction
We selected 12 dierent features, divided into two categories: ight
level and state vector features. We explain these categories in the
following; a full list of the chosen features is presented in Table 5.
Flight Level Features. ese features contain information about
the aircra behaviour at the highest level, namely the distribution
of the durations of all its ights as well as the distribution of the
area covered by the obtained ights of the aircra. e distribution
is represented using the percentages of all ights falling into the
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Figure 3: Relative mutual information. Colors indicate the dierent physical feature groups.
chosen number of quantilesq based on the average bounds obtained
from the random sample in Section 4.2.
State Vector Features. ese features contain information at
the level of the collective state vectors, i.e., the distributions of all
of the aircra’s message content containing the heading, velocity,
vertical rate and altitude states. e distribution is based on the
training dataset as described in Section 4.2 and represented as
percentage of states falling into the chosen number of quantiles q.
ere are three dierent types of state vector features based
on their physical function: positional features, velocity features,
and acceleration features (or the rst and second derivative of
the position with respect to time). Positional features include the
altitude and heading values of their aircra. e actual position in
longitude and latitude values itself is not relevant, as it does not
generalize to be a distinguishing feature across aircra models and
continents. Velocity features comprise the horizontal velocity in all
three spatial dimensions as well as the speed with with the heading
values of the aircra change. Finally, acceleration features are
derived with respect to time from all four of the velocity features.
5.3 Feature Analysis
Feature Correlation. Fig. 2 shows the correlation between the
features calculated on the evaluation dataset. An illustrative exam-
ple is given by the heading quantiles. Here the rst quantile (i.e.,
the ratio of no to few changes in aircra direction) is strongly neg-
atively correlated with all other heading quantiles. is suggests
that many aircra only ever have either few changes in directions
such as commercial airlines, which stay in a straight line for most
of their ight duration. Aircra that have more or many direc-
tional changes in their ights can be clearly dierentiated on this
feature. Similarly, very high acceleration and deceleration are posi-
tively correlated in all three axes (X, Y, vertical), which reects the
capabilities and actual behavior of military ghter jets.
Beyond this, we can see strong relationships mainly between the
horizontal velocity and acceleration features, aircra with many
values in high X-velocity and acceleration bins also exert this be-
haviour in the Y-direction. On the other hand, many aircra either
fall into long ights with constant middling speeds (e.g., commer-
cial aircra), or instead exert many very low and very high speed
and acceleration values over the course of their ights, typical for
ghter jets or trainer aircra. On the other hand, few relationships
can be observed on the ight durations.
Feature ality. To obtain a clearer view on how the classi-
cation works and to identify potentially detracting features, we
estimated their quality. ere is a given amount of uncertainty
associated with the aircra category—its entropy. is amount
depends both on the number of classes (i.e., aircra categories)
and the distribution of the samples between them. As each feature
reveals a certain amount of information about the aircra category,
this amount can be measured through the mutual information (MI).
In order to measure the mutual information relative to the entire
amount of uncertainty, the relative mutual information (RMI) is
used. RMI measures the percentage of entropy removed from the
aircra category (cat ) when a feature (F ) is known [5].
e RMI is dened as
RMI (cat, F ) = H (cat) − H (cat|F )
H (cat) (1)
where H (A) is the entropy of A and H (A|B) denotes the entropy
of A conditional on B. In order to calculate the entropy of a feature
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Figure 4: Accuracy of the classication based on the number of ights fmin (le) and feature quantiles q (right).
it has to be discrete. As most features are continuous we perform
discretization using an EqualWidthDiscretization (EWD) algorithm
with 20 bins [9]. is algorithm typically produces good results
without requiring supervision. As outliers may have a drastic eect
on the RMI computation, we use the 1st and 99th percentile instead
of the minimal and maximum values to compute the bin boundaries
in order to prevent large distortions. A high RMI indicates that
the feature is distinctive on its own, but it is important to consider
the correlation between features as well when choosing a feature
set. Additionally, features may be more distinctive when combined,
even when they are not particularly useful on their own.
Figure 3 shows the RMI for each of our selected behavioural
features, the colors indicating their physical feature group (posi-
tional, velocity, acceleration, or ight level). Overall, the velocity
and acceleration features (red and blue, respectively) share the most
information with the aircra category, with many of these having
an RMI of 15% or more. e positional and ight level features
are relatively less distinctive, which suggests that for example the
distribution of heading values or the overall ight durations are
more common to any aircra mission than a consistent behavioural
feature of a category. However, we choose to keep all features for
our classication to produce the best results.
5.4 Eects of Number of Flights and Feature
antiles
Finally, we more closely examined the eects of two feature param-
eters on the accuracy of the classication: the number of ights
fmin collected for each aircra’s feature creation, and the number
of quantiles q, into which the state vector features were divided.
Fig. 4 illustrates these relationships, by training a Support Vector
Machine with varying values of fmin and q.
e minimum number of ights required to be create a feature
vector has a signicant eect on classication accuracy. With no
lower bound, the overall classication accuracy is fairly poor at
61%. Such a result is likely due to the classier accounting for
lots of edge cases, making it less generalized. Performance quickly
increases to over 80% with 5 collected ights; increasing the number
of ights per aircra further, the accuracy increases to over 85% at
30 ights and 88.1% at 50 ights. However, by raising fmin to 50,
the training set size decreases substantially—we found an fmin of
30 to be a reasonable balance between data set size and accuracy.
Table 6: Summary of model optimization and training re-
sults across four types of classier.
Model Type Parameters Avg. Accuracy Avg. TP Rate
Support
Vector
Machine
Kernel Function: Cubic
C=4.795
Multiclass Method: One vs. All
Standardized Input
86.0% 84.4%
K–Nearest
Neighbors
Distance Metric: City Block
Distance Weight: Inverse Weight
# Neighbors: 4
84.6% 83.9%
Decision
Tree
Criterion: Gini Index
Max Splits: 1297 71.4% 67.9%
Ensemble
(Random
Forest)
Method: AdaBoost Decision Tree
# Learners: 402
Max Splits: 125
Learning Rate: 0.792
85.9% 84.0%
Table 7: Summary of metrics for evaluation runs of each
classier. Metrics are averaged across scores fromeach class.
Accuracy Precision TP Rate TN Rate
SVM 85.3% 82.6% 84.4% 97.5%
KNN 84.2% 81.1% 84.3% 97.2%
Decision Tree 71.4% 67.9% 65.1% 94.4%
Random Forest 86.7% 82.5% 86.1% 97.7%
All results were obtained with q = 10 and represent the mean of
100 classications.
e number of feature quantiles is also related to classication
accuracy. Intuitively, as the number of quantiles increases, the
risk of overing may increase. With the minimum of q = 5 the
accuracy was 84%, increasing to 87% at q = 10, and only increasing
marginally thereaer until leveling o at q = 40 and 87.8%. Further
increases to q = 50 show no positive eect. As such, we found
10 quantiles to be a good balance of accuracy and generality. For
the analysis, fmin of 30 was used, with scores averaged over 100
repetitions.
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(c) RF Evaluation Confusion Matrix
Figure 5: Confusion Matrices of observations on the evaluation set for the Support Vector Machine, Random Forest and K-
Nearest Neighbors classiers.
6 MODEL SELECTION
We now compare the results of four classiers for this classica-
tion task, implemented in Matlab: Decision Tree, Random Forests,
Support Vector Machines and K-Nearest Neighbors. With the set-
tings obtained in the previous section for fmin , we retained 3519
aircra. We trained each classier on 80% of our training set (2859
instances), retaining 20% (713 instances) for evaluation. We used
5-fold cross-validation on our training set to reduce overing.
6.1 Classier Training and Optimization
e results of the classication showwhether aircra categories can
be distinguished purely on their movement behaviour. Based on our
analysis above, we used a minimum number of ights fmin = 30
and number of feature quantiles q = 10. We trained a range of
model types to allow for comparison: Support Vector Machines
(SVM), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Decision Tree and Ensemble
methods (here Random Forests, RF). To nd reasonable parameters
for the models, we carried out a randomized search for 30 iterations.
As shown in Table 6, SVM, KNN and RF oer similar performance
during training across both accuracy and true positive rate. SVM
performs slightly beer across both metrics.
Decision tree is the worst performing model of the four; it per-
formed very well in identifying commercial and training aircra
but much worse in all other categories. is could be due to the
limited ability of the model to handle labels with fewer training
instances, with the tree instead mainly able to classify the more
frequent labels.
6.2 Classier Evaluation
Aer training, we evaluated our classier performance on the un-
seen test portion of our dataset. As shown in Tab. 7, performance
is in line with performance during training in Tab. 6. As before
modelling with a decision tree oered poor performance relative
to the other approaches, having a high TPR for the three most
populous classes and relatively low TPR elsewhere. As such we do
not consider this classier further.
e remaining three classiers have similar performance across
themetrics in Tab. 7. In Fig. 5 we can see the number of observations
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predicted correctly by the SVM, KNN and RF models. As indicated
by the performance metrics, each classier performs similarly with
slight biases towards certain classes. More specically, KNN made
more errors when classifying commercial aircra than the SVM
and RF models but performed beer on the trainer and transport
classes than the RF.
All classiers made similar classication errors. Transport air-
cra were particularly susceptible to this, with transport oen
being predicted when the aircra was actually business, or actual
transport aircra being misclassied. is is likely due to the low
number of transport aircra instances as well as their similarity to
other aircra movements or multi-purpose nature, i.e ying one-o
or irregularly timed routes between special-purpose airports [13].
Of the three classiers, RF has the lowest ‘spread’ of misclassi-
cation, i.e. misclassied business aircra fell into four categories
rather than across all the other seven. is suggests the model is
beer generalized than the others, which have quite a few cases of
single instance misclassications in unusual places, e.g. SVM and
KNN classifying a surveillance aircra as commercial.
ese errors also highlight the distinctiveness of some aircra
compared to others. We can see that trainer aircra are rarely
misclassied and when they are, the predicted class falls into one of
four other labels. Business aircra, however, have misclassications
across a range of labels. is could be a result of business aircra
being used for a wide range of purposes which in turn might result
in ights similar to other categories.
If a single classier is needed, the RF or SVM models provide
equally good across-the-board performance in comparison to KNN.
However, any of the three models would perform quite well and
could be used to construct a meta-classier. Further training exam-
ples in the lower population classes would help to explore whether
certain classiers perform beer for some classes than others, help-
ing to beer assess the benet of a meta-classier. However, this
would need to be done with care as individual classiers good at
identifying certain types of aircra might be outvoted.
7 ANALYSIS OF UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT
Table 8 shows the classication of approximately 1000 aircra,
about which there was no data available in any publicly accessible
database at the time of our snapshot. All selected aircra had at
least 10 ights and 500 state vector data points available for their
feature creation, to reduce the amount of noise to a minimum
and ensure that these are consistently used aircra identiers. To
obtain categories for these aircra, we used the random forest
classier trained on the known aircra data as described above.
As an ensemble classier it provides condence scores, i.e., the
percentage of times a sample has been classied as a particular
category. We used these scores as a cut o threshold, i.e., any
sample classied with a score of less than 0.5 in any of the eight
classes was judged as too low to provide useful insights. Taking
this into account, 52.3% of all aircra were classied condently
into one group. Table 8 shows the full results.
e commercial aircra could overwhelmingly be veried manu-
ally using the most current online source, FlightRadar24, as having
been put into service aer the time our metadata snapshot was
Table 8: Classication of unknown aircra.
Aircra Category Aircra Percentage
Business 116 10.9%
Commercial 316 29.6%
Fighter - -
Small Utility 49 4.6%
Surveillance 74 6.9%
Tanker - -
Trainer 2 0.2%
Transport - -
Other 509 47.7%
Sum 1066 100 %
Figure 6: Example of seven ight trajectories from a pre-
viously unknown surveillance aircra detected in Croatia.
Each colour is an individual ight and all ights clearly ex-
hibit ‘’circling’ features exhibited by surveillance aircra.
taken in January 2018. Indeed, of the 316 aircra, 305 were classi-
ed correctly, with the 11 misclassications being larger business
jets. e new airliners in this set included, for example, 9 Boeing
Dreamliners delivered to Norwegian in the rst half of 2018 [7] or
new aircra in China, the biggest growth market for commercial
aviation.
We further nd that a large number of aircra are seen by the
classier as business and small utility aircra (10.9% and 4.6% re-
spectively). is is plausible, as information on such private aircra
is not necessarily well-publicized, potentially even sensitive, and
many countries other than the English-speaking world either do
not require such aircra to be on a public register or even do not
publish any aircra register at all. While we can naturally still
not verify the accuracy of the classication, many such classied
aircra are regulars at typical business airports (e.g., Farnborough,
UK or Teterboro, US), improving our condence. e nal large
group was made up of surveillance aircra (6.9%), whose sensi-
tivity provides a clear motivation for not publishing their meta
information. We discuss a detailed case study on such an aircra
in the next section. ere was a small minority of aircra classied
as trainer aircra (0.2%). Finally, no military ghter, transport, or
tanker aircra were found in this dataset.
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Detection of Surveillance Aircra. We now take an example case
study of ‘interesting’ aircra categories being detected by Classi-
Fly. As rst laid out in [2] for the case of the United States, there
are many federal surveillance operations conducted with under-
cover aircra. Such aircra register with inconspicuous call signs,
registrations and transponder identiers, thus evading all database-
based detection and making behavioural classication necessary.
In the case of surveillance aircra, some of the dening features
can be visualized well just with the basic trajectory data. Most no-
tably, such aircra do not y from point A to point B in a relatively
straightforward fashion. Instead, they y to a target area (say, a
border area or an ongoing high-prole criminal incident) where
they circle steadily in search of persons or objects, shiing altitude
and center position occasionally.
Fig. 6 visualizes this precise behavior. It shows seven ights
from an example classied with very high condence (RF score
of 0.91) as surveillance aircra. While no information about this
aircra is available, as it does not appear in any database, it clearly
exhibits the paerns of an aircra used for surveillance of a narrow
area, which are picked up by the classier. e number of ights
with this nature clearly increases condence in the correctness of
this prediction. On further analysis, we found that these ights
were conducted in Croatia and we speculate that they are related
to military and anti-terrorist missions.
is case study shows that our approach generalizes across dif-
ferent countries and their surveillance institutions and is able to
detect surveillance aircra around the globe.
8 DISCUSSION
We now discuss the limitations of Classi-Fly, possible renements,
and potential countermeasures to our approach.
8.1 Limitations
e greatest limitation of Classi-Fly is the inherent non-specicity
of some categories. For example, it is dicult to identify the precise
use case of a business aircra; besides business travel, the same
Gulfstream G550 could be used for transport of goods for the mili-
tary or people for leisure, which can pose a potential threat to the
validity of the results. Likewise, there may be dierences between
countries and institutions not captured in these categories and the
ground truth. As long these do not pertain to behaviour, our meth-
ods work well but it is conceivable that dierent global regions or
military institutions may also exhibit dierences in behaviour with
their aviation hardware.
However, with further research into potential subcategories and
how to dene them based onmetadata such as the operator or owner
or the airports frequented, this could be mitigated and their dier-
ent behavior learned. is applies also to currently neglected air-
cra categories such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV, or drones)
and ultralight aircra (ULAC), which will become transponder-
equipped in larger numbers in the future and are a major interest
for researchers and the aviation industry.
8.2 Renement
Besides improving the ground truth metadata on the examined
aircra categories, other, non-behavioral features can be integrated
into Classi-Fly. As many wireless standards (not only in aviation)
give manufacturers a large amount of freedom over the actual so-
and hardware implementations, dierences emerge that can be used
as classication features.
On the physical layer, [19] proves that it is feasible to distinguish
aircra transponders based on anomalies in the frequency stability
of their messages. On the data link layer, research has exploited
dierences in the transponders’ random backo algorithms [32].
Besides these approaches, it is possible to add a host of features
derived from the actual message content sent out by the aircra. In a
non-adversarial seing where the aircra operators do not actively
seek to obfuscate their identity (beyond excluding it from public
databases), this would greatly improve classication accuracy.
Overall, we assume that certain uncommon aircra may be indi-
vidually identiable through the combination of features. Future
work will thus consider the possible granularity that several ap-
proaches can provide if they are combined and further quantify the
privacy impact for aircra owners and operators.
8.3 Countermeasures
As our classication approach is agnostic to any non-behavioral
features, it is more dicult to apply eective countermeasures
against it. Aircra could deliberately change their behavior to
avoid detection and classication. However, this forces the aircra
into not being able to full its intended function freely, for example
surveillance aircra not circling their target, or military ghter jets
deliberately ying slowly. is limits the potential benet of such
an option.
Related work [33] has looked at countermeasures to the basic
enabling mechanisms of aircra tracking, which is generally based
on the ICAO identier or other directly identifying information
broadcast voluntarily by the aircra (such as its registration). ere
are two popular privacy-preserving approaches to aircra tracking
found in the aviation industry: the rst consists of not displaying air-
cra on popular web feeds (such as FlightRadar24 or FlightAware),
the second comprises the use of shell companies to hide the real
owners of an aircra and thus undermine the collection of accu-
rate metadata. Both ideas, while certainly popular, are ultimately
not eective against a moderate threat model that allows for the
independent localization of aircra [33].
e most eective countermeasure as concluded by the litera-
ture consists of the randomisation of the aircra’s ICAO identier,
making it dicult to continuously track the same aircra over
time. If done globally for all aircra, and in conjunction with other
pseudonymisation measures regarding the registration, it could
eectively thwart consistent aircra tracking and by extension also
Classi-Fly. However, the cat may largely be out of the bag already;
with the current widespread availability of comprehensive aviation
data there is sucient input available for training.
9 RELATEDWORK
e classication of objects or subjects based on wireless commu-
nication has been a popular eld of research, in particular with a
focus on security and privacy aspects. Exemplary studies outside
the aviation domain range from the mobility states of humans [24]
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to the classication of intruders (people, soldiers, vehicles) in a
military seing [3].
e closest related academic research is the classication of dif-
ferent types of ground vehicles. Vehicle type classication is an
important signal processing task with widespread military and civil-
ian applications in intelligent transportation systems [10]. Several
data types have been used for vehicle classications, collected for
example from acoustic or seismic [30, 38] sensor sources. While
these may be applicable in the aviation domain, too, our work
focuses on the trajectories for classication.
Regarding such trajectories, the authors in [21] used GPS-based
tracks of cab drivers to study their behavior and classify them into
high-earning and average-earning drivers through the use of angu-
larity and travel time features. Using taxi tracks with a dierent
focus, further work aempted to uncover anomalous trajectories
in a dataset by comparing and isolating tracks which are few and
dierent from the majority [39].
Most closely related in the vehicle domain, the authors in [35]
distinguish two classes of vehicles (trucks and passenger cars) using
GPS data extracted from mobile trac sensors with a misclassi-
cation rate of 4.6%. e main features are based on the vehicles’
acceleration and deceleration behavior. Our work transfers this
idea into three dimensions and applies it to the very dierent speeds
and vehicle types found in aviation.
In the aircra domain, wireless classication has focused on
traditional non-cooperative PSR communication as the medium.
Such work exists for both military [20] and commercial aircra
[40] and exploits for example Doppler signatures [8] and high res-
olution range proles [40] to identify the type of aircra seen by
the radar. However, primary radars are prohibitively expensive
and thus widely inaccessible for research. As they are being re-
placed globally with the more accurate and cost-ecient ADS-B,
we choose to focus on this cheap and openly available source of
aircra trajectories.
Finally, the closest non-academic work related to our approach
is the successful aempt of investigative journalists to uncover
unknown surveillance aircra in the USA, which was presented
at DEFCON 25 [15]. e authors report on the background of so-
called spy aircra, which are identied using a machine learning
approach on aircra ight data pre-processed by a large commer-
cial tracking website. While we follow a similar basic approach
concerning such surveillance aircra in this work, we systemati-
cally analyze the eectiveness and validity of applying machine
learning to aircra behavior. In order to do this, we process a large
open data set, and discuss requirements on features and number of
ights. Furthermore, we generalize this approach to many aircra
categories.
10 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented Classi-Fly, a machine learning method to
infer the categories of aircra, both anonymous and known, based
purely on their movement behavior. We validate our approach using
publicly available ight data, comprising several hundred thousand
ights with tens of millions of states in conjunction with meta
information obtained from publicly available aircra registries. Our
results show that we can obtain the category of an aircra with a
likelihood of almost 90%, based on features obtained from 30 ights
or fewer. In cases where no metadata is publicly available for an
aircra, we show that our approach can be used to create this data,
which is necessary for many research projects based on air trac
communication. Finally, we have examined a case study showing
that it is possible to automatically discover sensitive aircra in a
large data set using Classi-Fly, including police, surveillance and
military aircra.
Future work in this area can focus on dening even more air-
cra categories relevant for new and existing research applications.
Specically, we plan to extend the existing categories to include
UAV and other non-standard aircra such as gliders or ULAC. is
requires these aircra categories to have suciently broad equipage
with ADS-B transponders or alternatives such as FLARM but can
be a worthwhile expansion of coverage in many countries where
FLARM is popular.3 Dierences in behaviour across institutions
and global regions could also be of much further interest.
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